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INTRODUCTION
Many firms are linking compensation to performance by implementing output-based incentive programs at every level of the organization [Schlesinger and Heskett, 1991; Coopers and Lybrand, 1992; Buchholz, 1996; McClain, 1998; Pfeffer, 1998 ].
1 However, limited empirical evidence exists on the performance impacts of such programs designed for frontline employees [Brown, 1992; Indjejikian, 1999] . While several research studies have addressed the immediate impact [Pearce, Stevenson and Perry, 1985; Wagner, Rubin and Callahan, 1988; Banker, Lee and Potter, 1996; Lazear, 1996] , formal empirical evidence on the multiperiod effects on employee effort and on employee selection and retention is lacking [Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992] . Using individual productivity data for 3776 employees for ten quarters following the implementation of an outcome-based incentive plan, this study explores alternative sources of continuing productivity gains.
Much management accounting research has focused on the design of compensation contracts. From an agency theory perspective, outcome-based incentives increase an organization's overall productivity by attracting and retaining the more productive employees (selection effect) and/or by inducing employees to increase or to better allocate their effort (effort effect) [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992] . The selection effect occurs because an outcomebased compensation contract can act as a screening device that encourages the less productive employees to leave and that motivates the more productive employees to join or remain with 1 Buchholz (1996) reports that Buck Consultants estimate that in 1997 37% of Fortune 1,000 companies offered bonus plans to hourly employees, up from 26% in 1993. Moreover, the bonuses amounted to a larger percentage of salary, 7.8% in 1997 versus 4.5% in 1993. the firm [Rao, 1990] . The transition from an equilibrium characterized by a less productive workforce to one with a more productive workforce, however, may not be instantaneous.
Employees may not know their own ability with certainty, and, may learn about it only as they receive initial feedback on their performance. Therefore, progressively higher levels of organizational sales productivity are expected over time as some employees realize that they are less productive and leave, and are replaced by more productive employees.
The effort effect occurs because an output-based incentive plan motivates employees to allocate more effort to learn more productive ways to perform their tasks [Feltham and Xie, 1994] . Anticipating performance-based incentives over multiple periods, employees may be more willing to invest in activities that will enhance their future selling ability [Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin, 1985] . For example, in a selling context, employees can increase their short-term routine selling effort or their long-term effort in developing customer relations and loyalty that will eventually result in higher future sales. Economic theory suggests that employees with a long multi-period decision horizon will devote effort to learn more productive ways to perform their tasks [Latham and Dossett, 1978; Wagner, Rubin and Callahan, 1988] . To the extent employees invest effort in learning how to improve their productivity, performance should continue to improve over time (rather than instantaneously) following the introduction of a performance-based compensation plan.
There is little research on the timing and relative magnitudes of multi-period selection and effort effects of performance-based compensation on continuing productivity improvements. Banker, Lee and Potter (1996) examined the impact of the implementation of a performance incentive plan on storewide sales for fifteen retail outlets. In addition to finding that plan implementation was associated with an immediate increase in storewide sales, the study documented that there was also a continuing improvement (see Figure 1 ).
Specific causes of continuing storewide performance improvement could not be identified with store-level data.
This paper examines individual level productivity (quarterly sales per hour) data from ten retail stores at Banker, Potter and Lee's (1996) research site that had implemented the incentive plan. The study evaluates whether the continuing increase in sales performance is due to the attraction and retention of more productive sales employees (selection effect) or whether it is due to continuing individual productivity gains driven by the improvements in employee effort (effort effect). Consistent with the predictions of agency theory, the results suggest that both these effects contribute to continuing improvements in performance.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the research site and the nature of the performance-based incentive plan. Section 3 develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the econometric model and estimation procedures. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
RESEARCH SITE
The research site is a division of a Fortune 500 company that is focused exclusively on retailing. The division operates a number of retail outlets over a large geographic area. Each retail outlet sells similar merchandise to the general public. Most of the stores are located in or near shopping malls or urban areas. As one of America's largest retailers, its stated selling strategy is to provide customers with exceptional value. Building on its history of excellence in customer service, the division initiated its performance-based incentive plan for sales consultants in 1987. The main objectives of this plan were to provide superior customer service beyond the customer's expectations and to attract, retain, and motivate productive sales consultants through increased earnings opportunity. Prior to the implementation of the performance-based incentive plan, employee compensation was based on fixed hourly wages.
Because division managers were unsure about the precise extent of the impact of the plan on sales performance, the conversion of stores to the plan occurred over a four-year period. Initially, the division implemented the plan in one store. By the end of 1990, a total of 15 stores out of a total of 34 stores in this geographic region had implemented the plan.
Senior managers believed that by holding back stores they would be able to assess the impact of the incentive plan parameters on performance and hence fine-tune the plan prior to implementing it for the entire salesforce.
The performance-based incentive plan was an add-on bonus program. The key features of the incentive plan are as follows: Each week sales consultants were paid a base salary equal to their hourly rate times hours worked. This base salary was at the same rate as that prior to plan implementation. In addition, each quarter sales consultants could increase their remuneration through a bonus. Sales consultants earned a cash bonus payment each quarter if the quarterly sales generated by the consultant exceeded her pre-specified sales goal.
Pre-specified sales goals were established for each sales consultant based on her hourly wage rate, hours worked, her department or merchandise group and other proprietary factors. The employee's bonus was computed as a percentage of the employee's actual sales minus her prespecified sales goal in a quarter.
Failure to meet the quarterly goal did not result in a pay reduction. However, the plan provided for possible termination if the sales goal was not met in two consecutive quarters. If an employee failed to meet her quarterly sales goals, she was subject to the "Below Requirement" process. This process was intended to communicate to sales consultants whose job performance was below par that it must be improved within a specific period of time or termination would result. Managers, using a monthly performance status monitor, met with poor performing sales consultants to inform them of their progress and to instruct and advise sales consultants on what specific actions were needed to improve performance. Sales consultants did not receive annual merit increases, and promotions were rare. Thus, the bonus program was the only significant reward for high performance. On average, bonuses approximated 20% of the base salary of a sales consultant. Because these sales consultants have little opportunity for career advancement or other performance-based awards within the firm, the setting is particularly suitable for examining the effects of monetary incentives on individual performance.
Senior managers regarded the incentive plan as a major change for the firm and its salesforce. Recall that prior to the plan's implementation sales consultants were on straight salary. Raises were principally based on years of service and employee productivity was not formally tracked. Managers expected that the new incentive plan would motivate many changes in employee behavior, leading to improved customer service and ultimately resulting in higher sales. For instance, managers expected that sales consultants would now begin to build a client base in order to generate repeat sales. Selling efforts consistent with this approach would include developing and updating customer address lists, following up on major purchases by customers, writing thank you notes and contacting customers about upcoming sales and new merchandise. Managers also expected the employees to learn how to sell more effectively. This would occur as sales consultants became more capable of identifying a customer's wants and preferences. Training sessions were held by central administration prior to the plan's implementation to facilitate sales consultants' transition to this new customer-focused strategy and to introduce the plan to the employees. Moreover, to encourage a more responsive employee, the implementation of the plan coincided with empowering sales employees in merchandising and customer discount decisions.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
At our field research site the intent of managers was to develop, test and fine-tune an output-based incentive plan for its salesforce. While we expect that the design of the plan considered the factors we discuss below, we do not claim that the incentive plan is optimal nor do we test for its optimality [Jensen and Murphy, 1990] . Moreover, because individual data were not tracked prior to plan implementation, our study is limited to individual productivity changes subsequent to plan implementation.
Economic theory suggests that compensation contracts can affect organizational performance by sorting employees and by motivating employees to exert effort. Many firms face a selection problem of having to hire employees without knowing their skill levels. The adverse-selection literature examines contracts that take into account the different abilities of employees [Spence, 1973; Salop and Salop, 1976] . A performance-based contract results in the less productive employees leaving the firm and being replaced by employees with higher ability who expect higher incentive pay [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992] . These analytical results have been supported by several experimental studies in the laboratory which document that high skilled individuals select performance-based incentive schemes when given a choice between piece rate and fixed pay [Chow, 1983; Waller and Chow, 1985; Dillard and Fisher, 1990; Shields and Waller, 1985] . However, other than a few studies examining chief executive officer (CEO) turnover [Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988] , there has been little empirical research examining the role of pay-forperformance in attracting and retaining high-performing employees [Milkovich and Wigdor, 1991; Gerhart, Minkoff and Olsen, 1995] .
Performance-based compensation plans also help to alleviate potential moral hazard problems by providing incentives for employees to exert more effort, when it is not possible to monitor how hard they are working. The salesforce compensation literature also suggests that compared to straight salary a performance-based contract improves a salesperson's performance [Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin, 1985; Rao, 1990] . In a context where the agent has to choose among multiple effort dimensions [Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Feltham and Xie, 1994] , her performance is expected to increase over time if the new incentive contract motivates employees to learn improved ways of performing tasks.
Economic theory suggests that employees who are offered incentives over a longer multiperiod decision horizon will devote more effort to learn improved ways to perform their tasks [Latham and Dossett, 1978] . Ultimately performance will improve as employees adopt productive activities and eliminate unproductive procedures [Wagner, Rubin and Callahan, 1988] .
The introduction of the performance-based incentive plan at our research site coupled with the provision for possible termination of employment for poor performance is expected to have two sorting effects. It will encourage employees who are skillful at selling to remain with or to join the firm as their expected wage will increase. Also, it will result in the less productive employees departing because their expected future wages under the new plan,
given the possibility of termination, are lower than their wages prior to the plan's implementation. Since employees may not know their ability levels with certainty, turnover may continue for several periods after plan implementation as employees update their beliefs about their ability based on their performance. To test these predictions, we specify the following hypotheses:
H1: The sales productivity of existing employees who remain after the implementation of the performance-based incentive plan is greater than that of existing employees who leave after the plan's implementation.
H2:
The sales productivity of new employees who are hired and remain with the store after the implementation of the performance-based incentive plan is greater than that of existing employees who leave after the plan's implementation.
H3:
The sales productivity of new employees who are hired and remain with the store after the implementation of the performance-based incentive plan is greater than that of new employees who are hired but leave after the plan's implementation. Agency literature assumes that only employers may not know agent type. Because it is possible that agents may not initially know their type and may only learn about their type over a period of time, the transition from a workforce characterized by a less productive workforce to an workforce characterized by a more productive one may not be instantaneous. Therefore, we expect that these sorting effects occur over multiple periods for both existing and new employees and specify the following hypotheses:
H4a: The proportion of existing but less productive (new but more productive) employees will gradually decrease (increase) over time after incentive plan implementation.
H4b: The proportion of new but less productive employees will initially increase, but will eventually decrease over time after incentive plan implementation.
As a result, store productivity will continue to increase as the salesforce composition improves over several periods after plan implementation.
Employees in the retail industry expend considerable effort to promote and obtain sales. Prior to the plan implementation, the fixed wage contract provided employees with little incentive to learn or to exert more than minimal amounts of effort needed to close a sale and restock the shelves. Outcome-based compensation provides incentives to employees to effectively close sales and to quickly restock merchandise. This suggests that "short term effort" exerted for immediate sales may increase when the plan is implemented. In addition, under the plan the consultant has the incentive to expend relatively more "long term effort" to learn more productive ways to perform her selling tasks, to build up a list of loyal wellserviced customers, and to encourage repeat purchases.
Under the performance-based incentive plan, employees with a long multi-period decision horizon will devote effort to learn improved ways of performing their task over time and generating repeat sales because they can trade-off the disutility of higher effort against the expected utility of higher future incentive compensation. In contrast, employees who have a short decision horizon have less incentive to devote effort towards learning the retail-selling task. Therefore, we test the following hypotheses:
H5: The sales productivity of continuing employees improves over time.
H6: The sales productivity of continuing employees improves at a rate greater than that of employees who leave the firm.
Finally, because the implementation of the incentive plan induces employees to go beyond their traditional roles, the resulting productivity gains for existing employees under the plan experience is likely to be greater than their productivity due to prior experience.
Therefore, we specify the following hypothesis:
The sales productivity of existing employees who continue with the store improves at a rate greater than the rate experienced prior to plan implementation.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Data
The data consist of 14,651 observations of actual quarterly sales for 3,776 employees located at ten retail outlets over a two and a half year period. No information is available concerning a specific employee's productivity prior to the implementation of the plan. The division did not collect individual performance information for non-plan stores during the sample period. Individual information for plan stores has only been tracked and retained by division headquarters since the third fiscal quarter of 1989. Although the incentive plan was implemented in 15 stores, we limit the analysis to the employees in the 10 stores that implemented the plan in this quarter or later. However, these 10 stores are representative of the 15 stores that implemented the incentive plan. The average sales per hour and the size as measured by the square footage of a store are not statistically different between these 10 stores and the five stores that were excluded in our study. In addition to quarterly sales, employee information includes hours worked in a quarter, hourly wage rate, store, merchandise group, and the number of years of service by the employee prior to the plan.
To examine the effort and selection effects we classify each sales employee in our sample into one of five employee types as follows:
. Employees who remained with a store no more than two quarters during the sample period.
2) NEWSTAY(D NS
. Employees who began after the plan's implementation and who remained until the end of our sample period.
3) NEWQUIT(D NQ
. Employees who began after the plan's implementation and who left the store prior to the end of our sample period.
4) OLDQUIT(D OQ
. Employees who were working in the first quarter of the plan's implementation and who left prior to the end of our sample period.
5) OLDSTAY(D OS
. Employees who were working in the first quarter of the plan's implementation and who remained until the end of our sample period.
To evaluate the impact of plan experience, we construct a variable, PLANQTR, that measures the number of completed quarters of selling experience an employee has under the plan. The variable PLANQTR takes on the value one in the employee's first quarter under the plan and increases by one for each quarter completed thereafter. We also include a variable PRIORQTR, to measure the number of quarters of an employee's experience at the store prior to the plan's implementation.
We measure an employee's productivity as her average hourly sales for a quarter (HSALES). Each store has its own demographic and competitive environment. It may to a limited degree also have a distinct management style. Because hourly sales productivity may vary by store due to these factors, we include an indicator variable (denoted by s) for each store. Full-line department stores have merchandise groups for children's, men's and women's wear, as well as for accessories. These merchandise categories within a store may require varying degrees of employee effort and of store support in the form of advertising and promotional sales. We, therefore, include indicator variables for the 14 merchandise groups (denoted by w) that are present in a store. Finally because the selling season has a large impact on sales productivity, we also include indicator variables for the fiscal quarter (denoted by q).
Estimation Model
We model hourly sales as: Because the error component : is randomly distributed across individuals we use the random effects model for estimation purposes [Greene, 1993, pp. 469-475] . Our estimation procedures are outlined in the appendix. Mundlak (1978) who argues that individual effects should always be treated as random rather than fixed.
2 All of the coefficients and hypotheses tests presented in this paper were also examined using OLS estimates of equation 3. No significant differences were detected. However, the OLS estimates are inefficient as the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis that the individual effects are zero, i.e. productivity. This is examined by comparing the δ coefficients. We investigate whether continuing employees' hourly productivity changes at a higher rate as it did prior to the plan's implementation by comparing η and δ coefficients.
RESULTS
Preliminary Store-level Results
Transition from fixed wages based on hours worked and tenure to a performancebased incentive plan results in changes to the salesforce that evolve slowly as the salesforce responds to the incentives in the new plan. If the performance-based plan is effective in sorting employees by attracting productive employees and encouraging low performers to leave, then plan implementation should result in high turnover. Turnover should gradually subside as the composition of the changed workforce begins to reflect the equilibrium induced by the new performance-based plan. Turnover data were available only after plan implementation. Empirical analysis of the trend in employee turnover at the ten stores that implemented the plan is reported in the first column of Table 1 . The parameter estimate, -0.760, indicates that the percent of the employees leaving declined by 0.76% per quarter from the level experienced immediately on plan implementation. This evidence is consistent with the plan resulting in a sorting effect that reduces over time as a better matching of the new incentive system and employee type occurs. Company documents also reveal that some managers at the company believed that the new incentive plan was impacting turnover.
Consistent with the above findings, one manager wrote "Initially, turnover in plan stores is higher than the nonplan stores as individuals work through changes… Although turnover is high during the first year of the plan, there seems to be a dramatic decrease after the store has been on the program for one year."
The second column displays the change in storewide hourly sales productivity (measured as quarterly store sales divided by total employee hours in that quarter) after controlling for the average sales in the 19 control stores that did not implement the incentive plan. The coefficient relating the average storewide hourly productivity to the number of quarters on the plan suggests that storewide sales productivity increased about $1.04 an hour on average for every quarter. In the analysis that follows, we explore the sources of this continuing improvement. average quarterly hours are understated. Interestingly, of the employees that were with the company at the start of the plan, those that remained (OLDSTAY) had 12 (=16-4) more quarters of experience prior to the plan (PRIORQTR) than those that quit (OLDQUIT).
Descriptive Statistics
Regression Results
Table 5 presents the regression results relating employee type, plan quarters and quarters of service to sales per hour. Time-series data may be sensitive to temporal changes in retail sales productivity due to changing prices or economy-wide or company-wide events.
Therefore, we include a control variable (GRWTHINDX) to capture the portion of hourly sales changes attributable to changing economic conditions. In our basic model (Model 1), we examine hourly sales productivity by employee after controlling for comparative store sales growth. The sales growth index (GRWTHINDX) is computed using the total quarterly sales for the 19 control stores that did not implement the plan. We assess the robustness of our results by using two alternative sales growth indexes: a retail sales index published by the Table 6 . In these regression models, similar to Table 1 Table 6 along with the results discussed earlier provide evidence that the incentive plan had a selection effect on the composition of the workforce.
The effect of incentives on motivating the employees to learn how to sell more effectively is evaluated by comparing the δ coefficients in Table 5 . The coefficient estimates shown in Panel A reveal that only the NEWSTAY and OLDSTAY employees appear to have significantly improved their sales productivity each period under the plan, and the OLDQUIT employees may have experienced a productivity decline before quitting. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H5 that the effort effect is positive for the continuing employees.
Hypothesis H6 asserts that the productivity gains of the continuing employees exceed those of the employees that leave. Tests of pairwise comparisons of the δ coefficients presented Panel B indicate that the OLDSTAY employees realize more productivity gains than either the NEWQUIT or the OLDQUIT employees. In addition, the rate of improvement for the NEWSTAY employees is significantly greater than that for any other group, including OLDSTAY. A comparison between the OLDSTAY and the NEWSTAY employees suggest that initially the NEWSTAY employees have lower productivity than that of the OLDSTAY employees. However, the difference in productivity between these two types diminishes with greater experience under the incentive plan.
Evaluation of hypothesis H7 requires a comparison between pre-and post-plan experience effects. The estimated η for OLDSTAY and OLDQUIT are positive and statistically significant, indicating that an employee's pre-plan experience has a positive impact on sales productivity. This finding is consistent with the positive link between experience and productivity documented for Navy recruiters by Kostiuk and Follmann (1989) and Asch (1990) . A comparison of η and δ coefficients for the OLDSTAY employees indicates that productivity increased at a significantly more rapid rate after the implementation of the plan (0.150 per quarter in the pre-plan period versus 0.972 after implementation). This suggests that even after plan implementation the experienced OLDSTAY employees are motivated to exert additional effort to learn how to sell more effectively. However, this result is not true for the OLDQUIT employees. All four models indicate no increase or deteriorating productivity of the OLDQUIT employees over the plan period. Figure 3 portrays the overall productivity for the different types of employees as they gain plan experience, based on each type's coefficient estimates for Model 1 in Table 5 . The median values for OLDSTAY and OLDQUIT pre-plan experience, 16 and 4 respectively, are used to compute the pre-plan experience effect on productivity. Evidence of a selection effect and an effort effect are clearly present in the figure. One goal of the plan was to encourage the less productive employees to leave and to attract and retain the more productive employees.
Figure 2 reveals that the employees who stayed with the store had greater hourly productivity than employees that quit, confirming a positive selection effect. Interestingly, the figure seems to suggest that productivity of the two types who remain seems to have converged over an 8-quarter period. Also, the graph indicates that the two groups of continuing employees are learning, as evidenced by their increasing productivity over time. The same is not true for the employees who quit.
While Figure 3 reflects the assumption that the sales productivity of the different types of employees due to effort effect is linear with plan experience, it is possible that the effect will increase at a decreasing rate [Carroll, Lee and Rao, 1986] . To examine a non-linear relation we include a quadratic term in our regression models to capture the second-order effort effect on productivity. The results based on this alternative specification are presented in Table 7 . Consistent with the earlier results these results also provide support for hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 that the productivity of continuing employees was greater than the productivity of employees who quit suggesting that outcome-based incentive plans act as screening devices.
The δ coefficients for the four quadratic models suggest that all except the OLDQUIT employees improved their productivity each period under the new incentive plan. The negative quadratic terms (θ coefficients) for all types of employees indicate that the productivity gains occur at a decreasing rate. Consistent with earlier results, productivity gains for OLDSTAY and NEWSTAY employees are higher than that for OLDQUIT employees. Figure 4 shows the overall productivity for each type of employees as they gain plan experience. These results are consistent with the prior results and support the selection effect and effort effect hypotheses.
In summary, the results indicate that there were differences in the productivity of the four groups of employees and these differences were consistent with predictions from economic theory. Specifically, the incentive plan appears to have been successful in attracting and retaining employees who were more productive than those that quit. Moreover, continuing productivity gains were observed only for the employees who remained with the firm. This is consistent with the continuing employees responding to incentives to learn how to sell more effectively.
Managerial Significance
A question that cannot be addressed using regression test results alone is the relative magnitude of the selection and effort effects on a store's average hourly sales productivity.
Determining the effort and selection effort magnitudes requires the consideration of the relative mix of employee types for each quarter under the incentive plan as well as each type's initial productivity and subsequent productivity gains.
To estimate of the selection and effort impacts, we first computed an average store's employee mix for each plan quarter. Using this empirical distribution of employee types we computed a store's average hourly sales productivity for the first eight quarters under the plan by weighting the employee-type productivity estimates (derived from the coefficient estimates in Table 5 ) by the proportion of different employee types. Specifically, we denote a store's overall productivity in period t as it P i it W t P ∑ = , where W it = proportion of store's workforce of employee type i in period t, i = OLDSTAY, NEWSTAY, OLDQUIT, and NEWQUIT, P it = sales per hour of employee type i in period t.
The increase in store productivity from period 0 to period t is:
In this formulation, the first term is the selection effect and the second term is the effort effect.
In Figure 5 , we further separate the effort effect of the existing employees from that of the new employees. Figure 5 displays estimated average sales per hour for a representative store over an eight-quarter period beginning with the first period on the plan. The overall effect is separated into a selection effect, an effort effect for the existing (OLDQUIT and OLDSTAY) employees, and an effort effect for the new (NEWQUIT and NEWSTAY) employees. It is apparent from the figure that both selection and effort effects make substantial contributions to the continuing increase in store sales productivity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Attracting, retaining and motivating frontline employees are some of the most critical challenges facing many service firms today. In this paper, we conduct an extensive analysis of detailed performance data for individual employees to isolate the causes of continuing productivity increases after a performance-based incentive plan is implemented. Analysis of individual-level productivity data is rare in published research. When available, the data are usually either subjective evaluations, such as supervisory ratings, or incomplete indices of the true scope of the job [Kostiuk and Follmann, 1989; Asch, 1990] . We find evidence that the continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based incentive plan result from two sources. The plan was associated with the attraction and retention of the more productive employees, supporting the hypothesis that a pay-for-performance plan acts as an effective screening device by sorting employees by ability. Moreover, the plan motivated the employees remaining with the firm to continually improve their productivity, which suggests that pay-for-performance provides incentives to invest in effort that has long term performance effects. The results of this field study thus support economic theories that have analytically demonstrated the importance of both selection and effort effects as determinants of an organization's workforce composition and productivity.
Appendix One
Estimation of Random Effects Model
We estimate parameters and their standard errors as follows. We first estimate equation (3) We re-estimate equation (3) using OLS with the transformed variables. Months Before/After Implementation Incremental Sales (standardized) NEWQUIT = An employee who joins the firm subsequent to the plan's implementation and then leaves after at least two quarters. NEWSTAY = An employee who joins the firm subsequent to the plan's implementation and remains with the store through the sample period.
OLDQUIT = An employee who is with the firm during the first quarter of the plan and leaves after at least two quarters.
OLDSTAY = An employee who is with the firm during the first quarter of the plan and remains with the store through the sample period. Median of PRIORQTR for OLDSTAY = 16. GRWTHINDX t = Growth index. In model 1 the index is computed using the sales trend at the 19 company stores that did not implement the plan. See section 5.3 for a definition of the alternative growth indices used in models 2, 3, and 4. 
